Re-examining Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: The Jurisdictional Question of the Court Competent to Extend the Mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal

Introduction

The introduction of Section 29A into the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 through the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 marked an important shift in India’s arbitral framework, aimed primarily at addressing systemic delays in domestic arbitration. Section 29A imposes a mandatory time-line for conclusion of proceedings and empowered the “Court” to extend the tribunal’s mandate or substitute the tribunal where necessary.

However, the provision has generated a central unresolved question: Which Court is competent to extend the mandate under Section 29A when the arbitrator was appointed by a High Court under Section 11?

The difficulty arises because Section 2(1)(e) defines “Court” as the “principal civil court of original jurisdiction”, whereas Section 11 vests the High Court with powers of appointment of a tribunal. If Section 29A(4) is read together with Section 2(1)(e), a district commercial court would be competent to extend or even substitute an arbitrator appointed by a High Court. Conversely, if Section 29A is read contextually, the power to extend must lie with the same Court that appointed the tribunal.

This interpretive conflict has produced two competing judicial approaches—one literal, one purposive—and culminated in the Calcutta High Court’s recent ruling in Best Eastern Business House Pvt. Ltd. v. Mina Pradhan.

I. Statutory Framework

A. Definition of “Court” under Section 2(1)(e) of the Act

Section 2(1)(e)(i) provides:

“2(1) In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires,—

…

(e) “Court” means—

(i) in the case of an arbitration other than international commercial arbitration, the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not include any Civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes;

Law Commission of India, Report No. 246 — Amendments to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (2014)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, S. 29A

bid., S. 2(1)(e)

Ibid., S. 11(6)

2025 SCC On Line Cal 190

(ii)…. ”

(Emphasis Supplied)

Pertinently, the definition is qualified by the opening phrase “unless the context otherwise requires.” This phrase is crucial because it allows the Court to deviate from the strict definition if applying it would produce an absurd or inconsistent result within the statutory scheme.

B. Appointment of Arbitrators under Section 11 of the Act

Section 11(6) states:

“Where, under an appointment procedure agreed upon by the parties,—

(a) a party fails to act as required under that procedure; or

(b) the parties, or the two appointed arbitrators, fail to reach an agreement expected of them under that procedure; or

(c) a person, including an institution, fails to perform any function entrusted to him or it under that procedure,

a party may request the Supreme Court or, as the case may be, the High Court or any person or institution designated by such Court to take the necessary measure, unless the agreement on the appointment procedure provides other means for securing the appointment.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

Thus, in most domestic arbitrations, the High Court becomes the appointing authority. Once a Section 11 appointment is made, the High Court ordinarily becomes functus officio except where the Act expressly preserves further supervisory powers.

C. Extension of Mandate under Section 29A

Section 29A(1), (3) and (4) stipulate:

“(1) The award in matters other than international commercial arbitration shall be made by the arbitral tribunal within a period of twelve months from the date of completion of pleadings under sub-section (4) of section 23;

(3) The parties may, by consent, extend the period specified in sub-section (1) for making award for a further period not exceeding six months.

(4) If the award is not made within the period specified in sub-section (1) or the extended period specified under sub-section (3), the mandate of the arbitrator(s) shall terminate unless the Court has, either prior to or after the expiry of the period so specified, extended the period:

Provided that while extending the period under this sub-section, if the Court finds that the proceedings have been delayed for the reasons attributable to the arbitral tribunal, then, it may order reduction of fees of arbitrator(s) by not exceeding five per cent. for each month of such delay.

Provided further that where an application under sub-section (5) is pending, the mandate of the arbitrator shall continue till the disposal of the said application:

Provided also that the arbitrator shall be given an opportunity of being heard before the fees is reduced.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

The structure of Section 29A clearly contemplates judicial intervention when the timeline cannot be met. What remains unclear is which court possesses that power where the appointment was judicially made by a High Court.

II. Divergent Judicial Approaches

Two divergent interpretive frameworks have emerged among the Indian High Courts.

A. The Literal / Textual Approach

The Andhra Pradesh High Court in Dr. V. V. Subbarao v. Dr. Appa Rao Mukkamala adopted a strict textual reading of Section 2(1)(e).

The Court held that:

“Court” in Section 29A must be interpreted strictly using the Section 2(1)(e) definition.

Therefore, even where the arbitrator was appointed by the High Court under Section 11, the principal civil court of original jurisdiction (usually the district commercial court) alone has the authority to extend or terminate the mandate.

The Bench reasoned that:

Parliament deliberately chose not to create an exception for Section 29A.

Judicially readingin an exception tied to the appointing court would amount to impermissible legislative rewriting.

This approach emphasises textual fidelity and legislative supremacy.

B. The Contextual / Purposive Approach

Other courts have taken the opposite view, grounding their reasoning in statutory purpose and structural coherence.

The Gujarat High Court in Nilesh Ramanbhai Patel v. Bhanubhai Ramanbhai Patel held that the power to extend the mandate must lie with the same court that appoints, as extension and substitution are supervisory powers inherently connected to the appointment jurisdiction.

Similarly, the Delhi High Court in DDA v. Tara Chand Sumit Construction Co. held that reading Section 29A in isolation from Section 11 would fracture the legislative scheme.

The Court warned that giving the district court power to interfere with a High Court appointment order would violate judicial hierarchy.

2024 (1) HCC (AP) 94.

(2019) 60 (2) GLR 1537.

(2020) 269 DLT 373