Reaffirming the Doctrine of Lis Pendens: Clarity from the Hon’ble Supreme Court on Rights of Transferees Pendente Lite

The decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Alka Shrirang Chavan v. Hemchandra Rajaram Bhonsale provides a clear restatement of the doctrine of lis pendens and its application in execution proceedings, particularly in cases involving resistance by subsequent purchasers. The ruling reiterates an important legal position: any rights created during the pendency of a dispute remain subject to the final outcome of that dispute.

The matter has its origins in an agreement for sale executed in 1973, followed by the institution of a suit for specific performance in 1986. A notice of lis pendens was registered shortly thereafter. Despite this, the judgment debtor proceeded to execute multiple sale deeds in 1987 in respect of the suit property. The appellants, who later derived title through these transactions, claimed independent ownership and possession.

The Trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff in 1990, and the decree attained finality. Subsequently, a court-executed sale deed was issued in 1993, transferring title to the decree holder. However, possession remained disputed for several years due to continued resistance—initially from the judgment debtor and thereafter from the subsequent purchasers. The primary question before the Supreme Court was whether such transferees pendente lite could resist execution on the ground that they were not parties to the original proceedings, and whether the transfer of title in favour of the decree holder could be challenged on this basis.

The Hon’ble Court rejected these contentions and reaffirmed the position under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. It emphasised that the doctrine of lis pendens is founded on principles of public policy and is intended to ensure that the outcome of litigation is not defeated by transfers made during its pendency. While such transfers are not void, they remain subordinate to the rights ultimately determined in the suit. A transferee pendente lite cannot claim a better title than the transferor and is bound by the decree in the same manner.

The Hon’ble Court also considered the role of execution proceedings under Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure. Although the law permits adjudication of claims raised by obstructionists, the Court clarified that where such obstruction is by a transferee pendente lite, the scope of inquiry is necessarily limited. Permitting a re-examination of title at the execution stage in such cases would effectively allow the executing court to go behind the decree, which is impermissible.

It was further held that the absence of subsequent purchasers in the execution of the conveyance does not affect the validity of the title passed to the decree holder. The Hon’ble Court also observed that once a decree for specific performance has attained finality and has been executed through the court, the transfer is complete and binding. Subsequent purchasers, having stepped into the shoes of the judgment debtor, remain bound by the outcome of the proceedings.

In conclusion, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has reaffirmed that the doctrine of lis pendens is a substantive principle that cannot be diluted through subsequent transfers or procedural objections. The judgement clarifies that any interest acquired during the pendency of litigation carries an inherent limitation—it remains contingent upon the final adjudication of rights in the suit. For purchasers, the judgment serves as a reminder that due diligence must extend beyond title verification to include an assessment of ongoing disputes, as any transaction entered into during such pendency will be subject to the outcome of those proceedings.