Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Act”) authorises “a party” to seek interim measures “before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with section 36.” The express inclusion of a post‑award window marks a deliberate departure from Article 9 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which does not contemplate interim relief between award and enforcement.
Yet Indian courts long disagreed on whether an unsuccessful party, one without an enforceable award could invoke Section 9 after the award while pursuing a challenge under Section 34. The Supreme Court’s decision in Home Care Retail Marts Pvt. Ltd. v. Haresh N. Sanghavi[1] (26 April 2026) resolves this conflict, re‑anchoring Section 9 in its text and transforming post‑award relief from an enforcement‑centric device into a party‑neutral safeguard.
Foundational Approach: Party Neutrality
The Supreme Court’s first readings of Section 9 focused on its language and structure.
In Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. NEPC India Ltd.[2], the Court held that the court may entertain a Section 9 application “either before arbitral proceedings or during arbitral proceedings or after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with Section 36 of the Act.” The post‑award period was treated as an independent and legitimate stage for interim relief.
In Firm Ashok Traders v. Gurumukh Das Saluja[3], the Court explained that the entitlement to invoke Section 9 flows from being “a party to an arbitration agreement,” within Section 2(h), and that “the qualification… is of being a ‘party’ to an arbitration agreement.” Section 9 was said to operate “before, during or after” arbitration, but before enforcement, with no distinction between successful and unsuccessful parties.
These decisions thus read Section 9 as a broadly available, party‑neutral remedy at three temporal points, grounded solely in the statutory definition of “a party.”
The “Fruits of the Award” Approach
A restrictive line of High Court authority, led by the Bombay High Court in Dirk India Pvt. Ltd. v. Maharashtra State Electricity Generation Co. Ltd.[4], re‑cast post‑award Section 9 as enforcement‑centric. The Court held that Section 9(ii) “is intended to protect… the fruits of a successful conclusion of the arbitral proceedings,” and reasoned that an unsuccessful party “cannot obviously have an arbitral award enforced in accordance with Section 36.”. It described post‑award measures as “a step in aid of enforcement… intended to ensure that enforcement of the award results in a realisable claim and that the award is not rendered illusory. On this logic, a losing party had no “fruits” to protect and was therefore, disentitled to seek post‑award Section 9 relief. This reasoning was followed in subsequent Bombay cases, including Wind World (India) Ltd. v. Enercon GmbH and Ors.[5]
The Delhi High Court in Nussli Switzerland Ltd. v. Organising Committee Commonwealth Games 2010[6] likewise stressed contextual interpretation, drawing on State of West Bengal v. Union of India to insist that Section 9 must be read within the overall statutory scheme. Although it acknowledged the breadth of “a party,” it effectively aligned “a party” at the post‑award stage with the successful party, reiterating the “fruits of the award” rationale.
In National Highways Authority of India v. Punjab National Bank and Anr.[7], a co‑ordinate bench (per Manmohan, J.) followed Dirk India and Nussli, reinforcing the view that unsuccessful parties could not maintain post‑award Section 9 petitions.
The Karnataka High Court in Smt. Padma Mahadev v. Sierra Constructions Pvt. Ltd.[8] and the Madras High Court in A. Chidambaram v. S. Rajagopal and Ors.[9] adopted the same approach, holding that unsuccessful parties cannot seek post‑award Section 9 relief and reading “a party” as contextually limited to the successful side at that stage.
Perceived support from Hindustan Construction
This restrictive strand seemed to gain indirect support from Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.[10], where the Supreme Court, while addressing enforcement and stay, cited Dirk India’s characterisation of post‑award relief as a “step in aid of enforcement” meant to ensure that the award is not rendered illusory. Although Hindustan Construction did not decide the maintainability of Section 9 petitions by unsuccessful parties, its language was frequently invoked to justify an enforcement‑centric understanding of Section 9 at the post‑award stage.
The Counterview: Protecting the Dispute
Parallely, another line of decisions treated Section 9 as a mechanism to protect the subject matter or the amount in dispute, regardless of which party held the award.
The Gujarat High Court in GAIL (India) Ltd. v. Latin Rasayani Pvt. Ltd.[11] allowed a post‑award Section 9 petition by an unsuccessful party, provided it could demonstrate a bona fide apprehension of injury or dissipation of the subject matter pending a Section 34 challenge. The Supreme Court later noted that GAIL correctly recognised interim measures as available “to all parties who demonstrate a bona fide apprehension of injury or dissipation of the subject matter pending Section 34 proceedings.”
Similarly, the Telangana High Court in M/s Saptarishi Hotels Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. NITHM[12] and the Punjab & Haryana High Court in DLF Home Developers Ltd. v. Orris Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.[13] held that unsuccessful parties could seek post‑award protection under Section 9, emphasising the need to preserve the subject matter of the dispute or the amount in controversy until the challenge to the award is resolved.
Doctrinal Changes: Moving Away from Restriction
Expanded Section 34 Powers
A key assumption underpinning the restrictive view was that the Section 34 court could only set aside or uphold an award, so that the post‑award phase was exclusively about securing a determinate “fruit” before enforcement. The Constitution Bench in Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd.[14] rejected this binary model, holding that courts under Sections 34 and 37 may, in appropriate cases, modify awards by severing invalid portions, correcting computational or clerical errors, or adjusting post‑award interest. The 2026 judgment acknowledges that this expanded remedial power undermines the conceptual foundation of decisions like Dirk India.
Reaffirmation of Broad Interim Powers
In Essar House Pvt. Ltd. v. Arcelor Mittal Nippon Steel India Ltd.[15], the Supreme Court reiterated that Section 9 “confers wide power on the Court to pass orders securing the amount in dispute” before, during, and after arbitration but prior to enforcement, and that the court must consider a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable harm. This formulation is status‑neutral and became an important reference point for the 2026 decision.
The 2026 Reset: Party-Neutral Relief
Meaning of “Party”
In Home Care Retail Marts Pvt. Ltd. v. Haresh N. Sanghavi, the Supreme Court returns to the statutory text. It notes that Section 9 opens with “a party,” defined by Section 2(h) as “a party to an arbitration agreement,” and that neither provision draws a distinction between successful and unsuccessful parties. The Court holds that varying the meaning of “a party” depending on the outcome of the arbitration “would result in an anomalous situation” and amount to judicial amendment.
Relying on classic canons and authorities such as R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay[16], Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Bombay[17] and Craies, the Court reiterates that where the language is clear, courts must give effect to its plain meaning and cannot supply words based on a presumed intention.
Differentiating Section 9 from Sections 34 and 36
Reaffirming Sundaram Finance, the Court stresses that Section 9 permits any party to seek interim measures at three distinct stages, including “at any time after the award is delivered but before it is enforced in accordance with Section 36.”
It then draws a critical functional distinction: Sections 34 and 36 provide remedies against an award and for stay of enforcement, whereas Section 9 “ensures protection of the subject matter or the amount in dispute.” An unsuccessful party “cannot secure protection of its claim under Section 34 or Section 36,” and denial of Section 9 would therefore leave such a party remediless, even though the ultimate result of the challenge may alter the parties’ rights.
Overruling the Restrictive Line and Approving the Liberal View
The Supreme Court explicitly holds that Dirk India, Nussli Switzerland, Padma Mahadev and A. Chidambaram, insofar as they bar unsuccessful parties from invoking Section 9 post‑award, “do not lay down good law,” criticising them for a strained reading of clear statutory language. It contrasts the 1996 Act with Section 18 of the 1940 Act, which expressly confined interim measures to successful parties, and notes that the absence of such a limitation in Section 9 indicates a deliberate legislative choice.
Conversely, the Court endorses the approach of the Gujarat, Telangana and Punjab & Haryana High Courts, affirming that their recognition of unsuccessful parties’ locus under Section 9 correctly reflects the statutory scheme. It clarifies that Hindustan Construction did not address this maintainability question and is not binding on that issue.
Threshold for Unsuccessful Parties is higher
The Court concludes that “any party to an arbitration agreement, including an unsuccessful party in arbitration, may invoke Section 9 of the Act at the post‑award stage,” but adds that the threshold for grant of interim relief will be higher in the case of an unsuccessful party. Relief should be granted only in “rare and compelling cases” to prevent irreparable prejudice and preserve the efficacy of the Section 34 proceedings, with courts applying the usual tests of prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable harm drawn from decisions such as Essar House.
The evolution of Indian law on post‑award Section 9 relief traces a clear shift: from an enforcement‑centric model, tied to the “fruits of the award” and effectively limited to award‑holders, to a rights‑based, party‑neutral framework that protects the subject matter or amount in dispute until the arbitral process, including judicial review, is complete.
After the Supreme Court’s decision in April 2026, the position is settled: any party to an arbitration agreement, whether successful or unsuccessful in the award may seek interim measures under Section 9 at the post‑award stage, subject to a more exacting threshold where the applicant has lost in arbitration. This approach respects the statutory text, differentiates the function of Section 9 from Sections 34 and 36, and balances finality of awards with the need to prevent irreparable prejudice, thereby strengthening the coherence and effectiveness of India’s arbitration regime.
[1] 2026 INSC 415
[2] (1999) 2 SCC 479
[3] (2004) 3 SCC 155
[4] 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 481
[5] 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 1147
[6] 2014 SCC OnLine Del 4834
[7] 2023 SCC OnLine Del 4810
[8] COMAP No. 2 of 2021, dated March 22, 2021
[9] OA No. 843 of 2024
[10] (2020) 17 SCC 324
[11] 2014 SCC OnLine Guj 14836
[12] 2019 SCC OnLine TS 1765
[13] FAO-CARB-51-2024 (O&M), dated February 21, 2025
[14] 2025 SCC OnLine SC 986
[15] (2022) 20 SCC 178
[16]AIR 1984 SC 684
[17] (2002) 4 SCC 297