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When Does ‘Certiorari’ Become Available Against a Tribunal’s Findings? Supreme Court Clarifies the Limits of Supervisory Review

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The writ jurisdiction of High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution occupies a distinctive position within India's judicial framework. While these provisions confer wide powers of judicial review, they are not intended to create an additional appellate forum against every decision of a court, tribunal or statutory authority.

This distinction assumes particular significance in the context of the writ of ‘Certiorari’.

Traditionally, Certiorari enables a superior court to quash the decision of an inferior court, tribunal or authority where it has acted without jurisdiction, exceeded the limits of its jurisdiction, violated principles of natural justice or committed a manifest error of law. Its function is supervisory rather than appellate. A writ court does not ordinarily reappreciate evidence or substitute its own view merely because another conclusion may have been possible.

The Supreme Court's recent decision in Shri Prakash Narain Sharma (Dead Through Legal Representative) v. M/s Burmah Shell Co-operative Housing Society (Regd.) & Ors.[2026 INSC 927] examines the difficult boundary between a permissible exercise of certiorari jurisdiction and an impermissible reassessment of factual findings. The Court was required to consider whether the Delhi High Court had exceeded its writ jurisdiction by setting aside concurrent decisions of an Arbitrator and the Delhi Co-operative Tribunal. In upholding the High Court's decision, the Supreme Court reaffirmed an important principle: while certiorari cannot be converted into an appeal, a finding based on no evidence or reached by ignoring material evidence that fundamentally affects the outcome, may amount to perversity warranting constitutional intervention.

The Dispute

The litigation arose from a longstanding dispute concerning membership of the Burmah Shell Co-operative Housing Society and the consequential entitlement to allotment of a plot. The original claimant asserted that he was a member of the Society and was therefore entitled to allotment. Following an earlier round of litigation, the dispute was remanded for consideration by an Arbitrator under the Delhi Co-operative Societies Act, 1972.

The Arbitrator held that the original claimant was a member of the Society and had fulfilled his obligations towards it. Since the claimant had died, the Arbitrator directed that a plot be allotted to his legal representative upon payment of the applicable cost. The Society challenged this decision before the Delhi Co-operative Tribunal, which affirmed the Arbitrator's order. The Society thereafter approached the Delhi High Court under Articles 226 and 227.

Before the High Court, the Society relied upon documentary material which demonstrated, according to it, that the original claimant had resigned from membership in 1951 and that his subsequent application for fresh membership had been rejected. No resolution admitting him as a member or membership certificate was produced. The High Court accepted these submissions. It found that the Arbitrator and Tribunal had failed to consider relevant documentary material and had instead proceeded on an assumption that the claimant continued to be a member throughout his lifetime. The concurrent decisions were accordingly set aside.

The legal representative of the original claimant appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the High Court had exceeded the permissible limits of writ jurisdiction by interfering with concurrent findings of fact.

The central question before the Supreme Court was therefore not simply whether the original claimant was a member of the Society. More fundamentally, the Court was required to determine whether the High Court could interfere with factual findings recorded by statutory authorities. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that certiorari is supervisory and not appellate. A High Court exercising such jurisdiction cannot simply reassess evidence and substitute its conclusions for those of a tribunal.

The Court referred to its earlier decision in General Manager, Electrical Rengali Hydro Electric Project, Orissa v. Sri Giridhari Sahu [2019 INSC 1020], which explained that certiorari does not permit a writ court to “don the cap” of an appellate court. At the same time, the judgment recognised that a finding unsupported by evidence may itself amount to an error of law.

Similarly, in Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences v. Bikartan Das [2023 INSC 733], the Court clarified that findings based on no evidence, surmises, conjectures or perversity may be challenged through certiorari. The principle emerging from these authorities is important. Not every incorrect finding is perverse. A finding does not become vulnerable merely because another interpretation of the evidence is possible. The threshold is crossed when the decision is so disconnected from the evidentiary record that it cannot reasonably be regarded as a legitimate exercise of fact-finding jurisdiction. This distinction preserves the balance between judicial restraint and judicial supervision. A High Court cannot become a second appellate forum, but equally, constitutional review cannot be rendered meaningless by treating every unsupported conclusion as immune from scrutiny merely because it is described as a finding of fact.

The Supreme Court's Reasoning

Applying these principles, the Supreme Court concluded that the High Court had not exceeded its jurisdiction. The authorities below had proceeded on the assumption that the original claimant continued to be a member of the Society. However, the record contained several documents directly challenging that assumption. These included the claimant's resignation and its acceptance by the Managing Committee in 1951, the transfer of his share to another member, the rejection of his subsequent application for membership in 1952 and the rejection of his request to deposit money towards a plot many years later. The Supreme Court found that these documents were directly relevant to the central issue of membership. Yet, the Arbitrator had failed to meaningfully consider them and had instead proceeded on the presumption that the claimant continued to be a member. The Tribunal, through what the Court described as a cryptic order, affirmed that conclusion without adequately engaging with the documentary record.

This, in the Court's view, was not a case where the High Court had simply preferred one possible interpretation of the evidence over another. The relevant authorities had overlooked material which went to the very foundation of the claimant's entitlement. Had the documents been properly considered, the Court held, they would have led to the conclusion that the original claimant was not a member of the Society. The finding to the contrary was therefore perverse and vulnerable to correction through certiorari. The Court also noted that there were four other members whose claims for allotment preceded that of the original claimant. Having concluded that the claimant had not established membership, the Court found no basis for granting him priority over other claimants. These equitable considerations provided an additional reason for declining to interfere with the High Court's judgment.

Wrong Is Not Necessarily Perverse

The most significant contribution of the judgment lies in the distinction it reinforces between a wrong finding and a perverse finding. A wrong finding, by itself, does not ordinarily justify certiorari. A perverse finding may. This distinction will be particularly relevant in challenges to decisions of tribunals and quasi-judicial authorities. Parties frequently approach High Courts alleging that evidence has been incorrectly appreciated. Such allegations, without more, cannot justify constitutional intervention. The stronger case for certiorari arises where there is a clear disconnect between the decision and the record—for instance, where a finding is based on no evidence, material evidence going to the root of the controversy has been ignored, or the conclusion is founded on assumptions and conjectures rather than the available record.

The focus, therefore, is not on whether the writ court agrees with the conclusion. It is whether the conclusion was reached through a legally sustainable decision-making process. The judgment also reinforces the importance of reasoned adjudication. The Tribunal's cryptic affirmation of the Arbitrator's findings was significant because it failed to demonstrate any meaningful engagement with documents central to the dispute. Brevity, of course, is not itself a vice. A concise order may adequately dispose of straightforward issues. However, where significant documentary evidence directly challenges the factual foundation of a claim, an authority cannot simply record a conclusion without addressing that material. The obligation to give reasons ensures not only that parties understand the basis of the decision, but also that courts exercising supervisory jurisdiction can determine whether the decision-making process remained within the bounds of law.

In our view, the Supreme Court's decision strikes the correct balance between two competing principles that frequently arise in writ litigation. On the one hand, High Courts must resist the temptation to transform Article 226 into a general appellate remedy. Statutory tribunals are created to determine disputes within their jurisdiction, and constitutional courts cannot routinely revisit factual determinations merely because an alternative view is possible.

On the other hand, judicial restraint cannot extend to protecting decisions demonstrably disconnected from the record. If a tribunal could avoid scrutiny merely by labelling an unsupported conclusion a “finding of fact”, the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would be significantly weakened.

The Supreme Court has correctly recognised that there is a meaningful difference between an erroneous appreciation of evidence and a failure to consider evidence altogether. The former may ordinarily fall within the domain of the statutory adjudicator; the latter, where it produces a perverse result, may justify constitutional intervention. The judgment is also useful from a litigation strategy perspective. A writ petition challenging a tribunal's order should not be framed as a broad invitation to the High Court to reappreciate evidence. The more sustainable approach is to identify the precise material that was ignored, demonstrate its relevance to the central issue and establish why the omission renders the ultimate finding legally unsustainable.

Ultimately, Shri Prakash Narain Sharma reinforces the essential nature of Certiorari. It is neither a substitute for an appeal nor an empty form of constitutional supervision. Where a tribunal reaches a conclusion after genuinely considering competing material, the writ court must ordinarily exercise restraint even if another view appears possible. But where a conclusion rests upon assumptions unsupported by the record while material evidence pointing in the opposite direction is ignored, intervention does not convert the High Court into an appellate court. It is an exercise of precisely the supervisory jurisdiction that certiorari was designed to protect.